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1 
ACTIVATION MEASURES IN SOCIAL SECURITY: 
LESSONS FROM THE DUTCH CASE 
 
Frans Pennings* 
 
Dutch social security has undergone important changes since 
the 1990s, in that the focus shifted from predominantly 
compensating the loss of income into giving incentives for 
claimants and benefits recipients to stay in or get back to work.  
While still providing a relatively high level of benefit if there is no 
chance to work (to the full extent), the legislature has been quite 
creative in adopting conditions that stimulate persons to do their 
best to be in work.  For this purpose, this is interesting for an 
American audience, since the USA system is far less generous out 
of fear that persons will not do enough to take care of themselves, 
while also leaving those who cannot earn a sufficient income 
alone.  A combination of activating conditions and a good safety 
net is, therefore, an interesting alternative. 
 
  
 
* Professor of Labour Law and Social Security Law, Utrecht University, 
Netherlands.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, Dutch policy makers became conscious 
that employers were using the Social Security Acts in ways the 
legislature did not intend.1  One improper use by employers of the 
Social Security Acts during this time involved employers sending 
adverse employees home for being sick; this was the cost effective 
solution because the sickness benefit fund would reimburse the 
wage costs lost by the employer.2  Because of this, adverse 
employees would feel “sick” when they were actually stressed so 
they could be sent home instead of providing the employee with 
other ways to relieve their stress.  However, employers had no 
financial incentives to assist their employees and solve the 
conflict because the Sickness Benefit Act covered the employees’ 
wages.3  Therefore, the employee remained in the picture under 
the presumption that the employee was sick.  Eventually, such 
employees could be considered disabled.  This was referred to as 
“activation,” meaning that individuals should be activated in 
order to make as little use of the benefit that was possible by 
motivating individuals to take responsibility for themselves.4 
Another improper use by employers of the Social Security 
Acts had to do with over providing disability benefits to employees 
than was intended by the legislature.5  During the 1970s and 
1980s, the mass redundancies in Dutch workplaces was a problem 
so, in an attempt to resolve this issue, a considerable number of 
employees who would have been terminated were instead 
provided disability benefits.6  Of course, such workers had to be 
disabled to some extent, but in practice they received full benefits 
even in cases where the employee only had a minor degree of 
disability.7  Access to benefits was very easy because often the 
 
 1.  See generally Belang en beleid: Naar een verantwoorde uitvoering van de 
werknemersverzekeringen, (Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat, Den Haag, 1994) 
(explaining the distribution of responsibilities of benefit administration). 
 2.  Sabine Geurts et al., Curing the Dutch Disease? Sickness Absence and Work 
Disability in the Netherlands, 53 INT’L SOC. SEC. REV. 79, 80 (2000). 
 3.  Frans Pennings & Paul M. Secunda, Towards the Development of Governance 
Principles for the Administration of Social Protection Benefits: Comparative Lessons 
from Dutch and American Experiences, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 
313, 348 (2015). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Duncan McVicar et al., Four Decade of Disability Benefit Policies and the Rise 
and Fall of Disability Recipiency Rates in Five OECD Countries (September 2, 2016), 
https://www.human.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/PAM/people/nrz2/The-rise-and-fall-
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assessing doctors of the benefit administration made the decision 
based off of the employee’s file. 
These improper uses of the system by employers illustrate 
how the benefit system was carrying the costs of these employers 
decisions in some aspects.  Of course, the government tried to 
change the rules, lower benefits, put fines on abuse; however, 
employers continued to request claims from the benefit system.8  
Thus, this problem needed to be approached differently.  First, it 
would be better to re-arrange the responsibilities in the total 
system9 and, second, employees should be incentivized to reduce 
the risk of becoming sick or disabled.10  Before the benefit 
administration, employer and employee associations did not have 
the proper incentives to reduce claims by employees and 
employers to the benefit system, so such associations were 
removed from the benefit administration.11 
There was a period of time when some believed that private 
insurance companies should administer some acts like disability 
and sickness, however, the government continued to supervise the 
benefits system under the control of the Minister of Social 
Affairs.12  An essential element of the benefit system is to assess 
employees’ incapacity for work, which is a significant factor in 
keeping the system public to maintain public responsibility.13  
One reason the benefits system cannot be privatized is because 
private companies wish to reduce benefit costs, thus, they have a 
conflict of interest.14  Therefore, the Uitvoeringsinstituut 
werknemersverzekeringen (UWV), the benefit administration 
 
of-disability-recipiency-rates-in-five-OECD-countries_v11-clean.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8T9-F5WY]. 
 8.  SICKNESS AND DISABILITY SCHEMES IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 (Nov. 2007) 
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/41429917.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR64-WHHY]. 
 9.  See VERANTWOORDELIJKHEIDSVERDELING SOCIALE ZEKERHEID: 
TERREINVERKENNENDE STUDIE OVER DE VERDELING VAN VERANTWOORDELIJKHEDEN 
OP HET TERREIN VAN DE SOCIALE ZEKERHEID (Sociaal-Economische Raad, Jan. 1994).  
The Social Economic Council is a tripartite (i.e. consisting of representatives of 
employers and employees organizations and independent experts appointed by the 
minister of social affairs) with the task (inter alia) to advise the government on 
socioeconomic issues. 
 10.  See generally Belang en beleid, supra note 1. 
 11.  See Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen 29 november 
2001, Stb. 2001, 624 (Neth.).  
 12.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 349. 
 13.  See generally P.S. Fluit, Verzekeringen van solidariteit, (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2001); see also FRANS PENNINGS, DUTCH SOCIAL  
SECURITY LAW IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (Kluwer L. Int’l, 2002)  (providing a 
general overview of the system). 
 14.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 349. 
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employees’ scheme, was established.15  The UWV is a national 
organization that administers the disability, sickness, and 
unemployment benefit packages, as well as other benefits.16 
Thus, the conditions for benefits are still governed by the law 
and the rights of the beneficiaries are not changed in comparison 
to the previous situation.  Instead, the way the responsibilities are 
organized varies according to the type of benefit. 
II. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS 
The new approach materialized when a statutory obligation 
for employers to pay wages during an employee’s illness was 
introduced.  In 1994, a new rule was introduced that employers 
had to pay sick employees for the first six weeks of their illness.17  
Small employers, which are defined to have less than fifteen 
employees, had to pay sick employees for the first two weeks of 
their illness.18  The new act was passed to incentivize employers 
to follow up with employees and determine whether ill employees 
were rightfully absent because employers would be responsible for 
income provisions.19  Additionally, employers were expected to 
reduce risks of injury and sickness caused by dangerous 
conditions in the workplace.20  Particularly, the construction 
industry had to take further measures to reduce the number of 
risks in the workplace.21  Although there were already acts that 
required preventive measures, the new provisions motivated 
employers to take further action to prevent injuries, accidents, 
and illnesses. 
Despite the uncertainty of whether the sickness act had the 
desired effect, two years later the employers’ responsibility to pay 
wages was nevertheless extended from six weeks to fifty-two 
weeks.22  The extension was created through an amendment of 
 
 15.  See Historie, structuur, huisvesting, medewerkers en Cao UWV, 
https://www.uwv.nl/overuwv/wat-is-uwv/organisatie/detail/historie-structuur-
husvesting-medewerkers [https://perma.cc/85VN-L38Z] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
 16.  Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra note 11.   
 17.  Pennings, supra note 13, at 12. 
 18.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 360. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 360-61.  For instance, measures that could be taken to enforce the rules 
more strongly include: wearing a helmet, enforced shoes, and protection barriers when 
employees were working on high-level sites.  Additionally, a policy to avoid sickness 
due to stress or conflicts at work could contribute to lower costs.  
 22.  Wet uitbreiding loondoorbetalingsplicht bij ziekte 8 februari 1996, Stb. 1996, 
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the Civil Code in order to provide sick employees 70% of wages for 
up to fifty-two weeks.23  In collective agreements, the parties often 
provided that this statutory minimum was to be supplemented to 
make up for the full wage.24  How this was done varied from 
agreement to agreement. 
The privatization of the Sickness Benefits Act has to do with 
substituting the right to sickness benefit with the employer’s 
obligation to pay employees sick pay.25  However, this does not 
really privatize benefits because the act defines what the 
employers’ obligations are and the rights of employees.26  The 
Civil Code has strict rules, however, the employer is entirely 
responsible for the costs and may supplement these laws with 
additional rules in order to realize his responsibilities.27  The 
employers must comply with the statutory obligations and are 
subject to rulings in court. 
Employers are able to, but not required, purchase private 
insurance to cover risks.  In order to allow a smooth introduction 
of the act and to gain a new, vast market, the joint insurance 
companies decided that when employers bought insurance they 
would not assess the health conditions of the employees, as this 
insurance covers all employees, so the employer does not choose 
specific employees the employer wants insured.28  When the risk 
was only six weeks, employers often bore the risks themselves, 
but upon the introduction of the fifty-two-week period, they 
bought insurance on a higher scale.29  In the insurance rules, 
employers often still bear risks, such as during the first six weeks 
of employee sick leave, or when the employee is absent  for longer 
than is covered in the benefits scheme, (stop loss insurance).30 
The Sickness Benefits Act is still in effect and applies to 
 
134.  
 23.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 361. 
 24.  See W.J.P.M. FASE ET AL., SOCIALE ZEKERHEID: PRIVAAT OF PUBLIEK? 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1994). 
 25.  ULRICH BECKER, FRANS PENNINGS, & TINEKE DIJKHOFF, INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARD-SETTING AND INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 445 (Alan C. Neal et al. 
eds.,Wolters Kluwer, 2013).. 
 26.  Id. at 381. 
 27.  Art. 7:629 BW (Neth.). 
 28.  ADVIES INZAKE KABINETSVOORNEMENS ZW, AAW EN WAO (Sociaal-
Economische Raad, Apr. 1995). 
 29.  T.J. VEERMAN & J.J.M. BESSELING, PRIKKELS EN PRIVATISERING: 
INTEGRERENDE RAPPORTAGE EVALUATIE WETGEVING ROND ZIEKTEVERZUIM, WAO EN 
REÏNTEGRATIE 27 (2001).  
 30.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 362. 
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persons who do not have an employer.31  An example of the first 
group are flexible workers, the other group is the unemployed.32  
This Act provides a safety net for unemployed and flexible 
workers.  The 1997 Act on Medical Examinations allows 
employers to employ individuals who have a higher risk of 
becoming ill because the act restricted medical examinations in 
recruitment procedures.33  Unless the particular job requires 
specific health requirements, it prohibits medical examinations as 
a standard practice.34  This Act’s purpose was to diminish the 
chance that chronically ill individuals will never get work. 
Not only did the benefit rules change, an amendment to the 
Law on Conditions at the Workplace forced employers to improve 
working conditions.35  One would presume that accidents at work 
would be reduced with better working conditions.  Furthermore, 
employers have to develop a solution to lower sickness at work.36  
Because of this, employers must determine all potential 
situations that endanger the health and safety of the employees.37 
The government did not find that employers obligation to 
continue to pay sick employees their wages was a sufficient 
reintegration effort.38  This was because private insurance 
reimbursed the employer’s obligation to pay wages.39  
Furthermore, employers’ version of reintegration measures would 
be expensive or bothersome than actually paying the wages of a 
sick employee.40  For these reasons, the Gatekeepers Act came 
into effect.41 
The purpose of the Gatekeepers Act’s was to limit employers’ 
 
 31.  Art. 18:1 WTZ (Neth.).  
 32.  Unemployed persons are also covered for sickness, even though that may not 
lead to a different income, since they may be disqualified for unemployment benefit 
during sickness. In addition, in case of long-term sickness, when they are not be able 
to work again full-time, these persons may qualify for disability benefits. These 
benefits are financed by contributions paid to the sickness and disability funds. 
 33.  Art. 3-5:1 WMK (Neth.). 
 34.  See E.L. de Vos et al., Evaluatie: Wet op de medische keuringen, DEN HAAG: 
ZON MW, June 2001.  
 35.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 362-63. 
 36.  Verdrag betreffende arbeidsveiligheid, gezondheid, en het arbeidsmilieu; 
Genève, 3 juni 1981 Trb. 1981, 4:1 (Neth.).  
 37.  Verdrag betreffende arbeidsveiligheid, gezondheid, en het arbeidsmilieu; 
Genève, 3 juni 1981 Trb. 1981, 5 (Neth.). 
 38.  Parliamentary Papers II 2000-2001, 27.678, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Wet Verbetering poortwatcher). 
 39.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 363. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Wet Verbetering Poortwachter 29 november 2001, Stb. 2001, 628 (Neth.). 
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ability to access to the Disability Benefits Act.42  The Gatekeepers 
Act requires both employers and sick employees to take on 
reintegration efforts if an employee’s illness is projected to last for 
a long period of time.43  When an employee expects to be sick for 
more than six weeks, the employer and the employee are obligated 
to make a plan for reintegration back into the workplace.44  For 
example, such a plan might involve adjusting an employee’s 
impairments in the workplace or by offering additional training 
or other jobs in the workplace.  Moreover, the employer and 
employee must regularly meet to determine if such reintegration 
methods are successful and if such reintegration plans have to be 
adjusted.45  Both the employee and the employer can force the 
other party to cooperate;46 if it becomes necessary, they can legally 
enforce cooperation.47 
The benefits administration, the UWV, may determine 
whether an employer’s reintegration efforts are satisfactory three 
months before the employee may apply for disability benefits.48  
To show that the activities have been sufficient, the employee 
must provide a report on what reintegration activities occurred.49  
When an employer’s actions are found to be unsatisfactory by the 
benefit administration, the employer is obligated to pay the 
employee’s wages for a maximum of twelve months.50  Altogether, 
the employer may have to pay wages for a total of three years.51  
However, when the employee has not cooperated satisfactorily, 
such employee may be refused disability benefits for a certain 
period regulated by the Disability Benefits Act.52 
A disadvantage of organizing social protection at a lower level 
is that it is difficult to have thorough research due to low reporting 
rates on actual payment to sick employees by their employers.  
Strict labor law and dismissal law narrow the ability to get out of 
the employers obligations.53  In the previously mentioned Act on 
Medical Examinations during recruitment, this Act was suppose 
 
 42.  See generally Art. 7:629 WGA (Neth.). 
 43.  Art. 658a para. 5 BW (Neth.). 
 44.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 363. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Art. 4.1:30 para. 2 BW (Neth.); Art. 658a para. 2 BW (Neth.). 
 47.  Art. 7:658b BW (Neth.). 
 48.  See Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Art. 7:629(11) BW (Neth.).  
 51.  See Art. 7:629 BW (Neth.). 
 52.  Art. 4.1:30 para. 1 WGA (Neth.). 
 53.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364. 
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to lower risk selection.  Another example of a law that reduces 
risks to employers is the dismissal law (laid down in the Civil 
Code) that contains the rule that an employee cannot be 
terminated within the first two years of sickness.54  Employers 
still can lower their risks by selecting employees carefully and 
terminating employees who fall ill during the period that they 
have reported recovery.55  How often this actually happens in the 
workplace is too difficult to research.  If an employer’s behavior 
becomes discriminatory, the law prohibits employers from 
discriminating against disabled persons.56  However, in practice, 
it is difficult to prove that in a particular situation the 
discriminatory nature of an employer’s behavior was grounded on 
disability.57  Furthermore, employers often would offer employees 
contracts for a specified period of time rather than an indefinite 
period so that the employer would not risk the possibility of 
paying sick employees’ wages.58  Employers could also use 
temporary work agencies.59 
After the Gatekeepers Act was enacted, larger employers 
formed in house plans using ill employees in other work capacities 
within the workplace.60  The benefit administration obligates 
many employers to pay sick employees for an extended period of 
after the first two years because the benefit administration does 
not find this to be enough of reintegration for sick employees.61 
In any case, as we can conclude, this new system strictly 
encourages employers and their ill employees to make 
reintegration plans for the ill employees back into the workplace 
as there are severe consequences when they are negligent.62  
Reintegration is most successful while an employee is still 
employed, this happens during the first two years of sickness 
because employers are prohibited from terminating such sick 
employees;63 this is a cornerstone of present day Dutch social 
 
 54.  Art. 7:670 para. 1 BW (Neth.). 
 55.  Art. 7:670b para. 3 BW (Neth.). 
 56.  See Wet gehijke behandeling op grond van handicap of chronische ziekte 3 
april 2003, Stb. 2003, 206 (Neth.). 
 57.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364-65. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 365. 
 60.  See F.A. Reijenga et al., Onderzoek evaluatie wet verbetering poortwatcher, 
(Astri, 2006). 
 61.  Id. at 15. 
 62.  Id. at 45-46. 
 63.  Art. 7:629 para. 1 BW (Neth.). 
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security policy because activation is very important.64 
In all, as we have seen above, the employers have been made 
fully responsible for sick pay, for up to a period of two years.65  The 
minimum rules are provided in the Civil Code, from which no 
exception is possible.66 
III. THE NEW DISABILITY BENEFITS ACT OF 2004 
Since the Disability Benefit Act (WAO) continued to have 
problems with high numbers of new entrants and only few 
beneficiaries leaving the benefit scheme,67 a new structural 
approach was followed in the new Disability Benefits Act of 
2004.68  In this approach, the priority of work above benefit was 
stressed so the WAO introduced new benefit opportunities.69 
The WAO makes a distinction between groups of claimants: 
(A) who are permanently disabled to at least 80%; and (B) who are 
either not permanently disabled, or who are permanently 
disabled to a lesser extent than 80%.70  The former group (Group 
A) deserves, in the view of the legislature, a generous disability 
benefit because measures to help them to get back to work are 
more difficult and pursued less than reintegration efforts in 
Group B.71  In this case, permanently disabled employees (Group 
A) receive 75% of their former wage as a benefit.72  Those who are 
permanently disabled by at least 80% incapacity are entitled to 
the benefit for the permanently disabled.73 
The second group (Group B) is subject to conditions and rules 
meant to reinforce their activation back into work.74  In order for 
members of Group B to be eligible for disability benefits, 
employees must be disabled exceeding a 35% rate of incapacity.75  
Members of Group B receive a wage-related benefit if they can 
 
 64.  See BECKER ET AL., supra note 25, at 443-56. 
 65.  Art. 7:629 para. 1 BW (Neth.). 
 66.  Art. 7:629 para. 9 BW (Neth.). 
 67.  B. Cuelenaere et al., Onderzoek evaluatie wia, 46-48 (2011). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See BAREND BARENTSEN, ARBEIDSONGESCHIKTHEIRD: AANSPRAKELIJKHEID, 
BESCHMERING EN COMPENSATIE (2003). 
 70.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 354. 
 71.  Id.at 355. 
 72.  Art. 6.2:51 WIA (Neth). 
 73.  Besliut Van 8 Juli 2000, Stb 2000 (Neht.). 
 74.  Art. 29 BW (Neth.), 
 75.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 355. 
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satisfy conditions relating to their employment history.76  The 
benefit’s duration is directly reflected in the group member’s 
employment history.77  The rules for entitlement and duration are 
outlined in the Unemployment Benefits Act, which is discussed 
below.78 
Group B claimants are entitled to up to 70% of their previous 
wages.79  When the right to this benefit has expired, or when the 
claimant is not entitled to this benefit due to an insufficient work 
history, a wage supplement benefit is payable, only if the claimant 
earns an income of at least half their residual earning capacity.80  
This is a provision, until this amendment, was not been found in 
disability schemes.81  Thus, if a person has an earning capacity of 
1,000 euro per month, they must earn at least 500 euro per month 
in order to remain eligible for the wage supplement.  This rule 
was designed to incentivize remaining in the work force or 
returning to the workforce after being absent due to illness or 
disability.82 
Wages are supplemented within 70% of the difference 
between an employee’s previous earnings and their earning 
capacity.83  For example, if a person earned 2,000 euro a month 
and is now only able to earn 1,000 euro, the wage supplement is 
700 euro.  This amount is payable, regardless of how much she 
earns, up to 1,000 euro, the residual earnings capacity,84 
incentivizing employees to take up as much work as they can.  In 
other words, it is attractive to work as much as possible, since 
income is not deducted from the benefit received. 
Alternatively, claimants who, upon the expiration of his or 
her wage-related benefit, do not earn at least 50% of his or her 
remaining earning capacity after disability, are eligible for a 
lower benefit, which, in the case of full disability, is 70% of the 
statutory minimum wage.85  In cases of partial disability, the 
benefit allocation depends on the employee’s incapacity rate.86  
 
 76.  Art. 59 WIA (Neth.). 
 77.  Art. 61 BW (Neth.). 
 78.  Art. 2:1 BW (Neth). 
 79.  Art. 1.6:15 BW (Neth.). 
 80.  Art. 7.2:59 BW (Neth.). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Parliamentary Papers II 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 8, (Brief to Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid). 
 83.  Art. 59-101 WIA (Neth.) 
 84.  Art. 56 WIA (Neth.). 
 85.  Art. 59 WIA (Neth.). 
 86.  Art. 62 WIA (Neth.). 
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Persons who are incapacitated by a physical disability to a level 
of less than 35% are not eligible for benefit.87  It was the view of 
the legislature that their incapacity rate is so low that they should 
be able to find work suitable for their level of ability.88 
Thus, there is now a consistent approach, elaborated in 
specific and unique new rules for each scheme, aimed at reducing 
the number of sickness and disability claims.89  Under this 
approach, when an employee is sick or disabled, employers and 
employees must do everything possible to assist the employee in 
returning to work or remaining at work.  The hope is that most 
employees could work in a modified capacity until they return to 
full health if necessary.90  If after two years, the employee is not 
able to earn at least 65% of what her income was before she 
became sick, the disability benefit scheme encourages her to keep 
working in her current capacity or seek work that could allow her 
to collect a greater portion of the benefit scheme.91  From 
evaluations of this program, it appears that the number of new 
entrants for benefits has been much lower than under the old 
Disability Act, although whether those who are disqualified 
actually find work is not so clear.92  The Act is still rather young, 
so there are not clear research results yet available.93 
Employers may choose to opt out of the disability scheme, but 
are not obligated to do so.94  If an employer chooses to opt out of 
the disability scheme, it is limited to exemption from paying 
contributions to the scheme; for this reason, the term ‘own risk 
bearer’ is used to describe employers.95  Instead of paying major 
contributions, in this scheme, the employer bears the financial 
risks of the disability benefits for the partially disabled for the 
first ten years of disability.96  The Public Benefit Administration 
still holds the power to grant or terminate and employee’s right to 
 
 87.  Art. 61-62 WIA (Neth.). 
 88.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.   Art. 23 para. 1 WIA (Neth.); Art. 54 WIA (Neth.); Parliamentary Papers II, 
2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar 
arbeidsvermogen). 
 92.  See Cuelenaere et al., supra note 66. 
 93.  WIA (Neth.) (Enacted Nov. 10, 2005). 
 94.  Art. 85 para. 1 WIA (Neth.). 
 95.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 357. 
 96.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen). 
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a benefit, and employers and employees alike remain bound by 
statutory rules regarding benefits.97  Since the employer pays the 
benefit, the employer has the advantage of paying lower 
contributions.98  After the first ten years of benefit payment to an 
employee, the benefit administration takes over the costs of the 
benefits paid to that employee.99  To supplement the costs, an 
employer may purchase private insurance to cover the costs of 
those first ten years of benefits.100 Usually, employers buy private 
insurance when they decide to opt out of the benefits scheme, and 
bear the risk on their own.101  These insurance policies are often 
adjusted to the individual enterprise concerned, and little is 
known to outsiders on the conditions, price and use.102  Employers 
who bear their own risk are responsible for reintegration 
activities of the employees for whom they bear the risk.103  Thus, 
they can influence their risk and if they succeed in getting a 
person back to work, they have the ‘profit’ of this work. 
Remarkably, risk bearers have the statutory power to impose 
a sanction, i.e., to reduce benefits in level during a certain period, 
if the beneficiary does not sufficiently cooperate in the re-
integration activities.104  Since the reintegration measure is an 
element of public law, the employer is seen as a body of public law, 
and subject to the rules of the General Act on Administrative 
Law.105  This causes a rather strange effect, because these powers 
fit in a system whereby the employer administers (partly) an act 
of administrative law.  This means that the system for motivating 
decisions and the possibilities of asking for review and appeal to 
the administrative court also apply (even though generally 
private law (labor law) is applicable to the relationship between 
employer and employee).106 
In conclusion, disability benefits provide financial incentives 
for beneficiaries and employees to return to work.  Although, 
employers are not directly involved in providing such incentives 
(except when a claim is made), they can be involved if they decide 
 
 97.  See Frans Penning, Kunnen Eigenrisicodragers wel hun eigen risico 
beïnvloeden?, TIJDSCHRIFT RECHT EN ARDEID (May 20, 2014). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See generally Cuelenaere et al., supra note 66. 
 101.  Id. at 69. 
 102.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 357. 
 103.  Art. 27 WIA (Neth). 
 104.  Art. 89 WIA (Neth.). 
 105.  See generally Art. 101-19 WIA (Neth.).  
 106.  See generally Art. 109-12 WIA (Neth). 
PENNINGSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/18  3:00 PM 
14 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19.1 
to bear their own risk.  In such cases, a safeguard remains because 
the Public Benefits Administration continues to hold decision 
making power. 
IV. DUTCH UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
The current Unemployment Benefits Act was adopted in 
1986.107  It provides claimants, who lose at least five working 
hours per week with an unemployment benefit.108  This way, 
claimants do not have to be totally out of work in order to be 
considered unemployed.109 
In order to be collect this particular benefit, a claimant must 
satisfy the following entitlement conditions: she has to be an 
employee; she has to show that she has worked a certain period; 
she has to be unemployed, which means that she must suffer a 
relevant loss of working hours; she must no longer be entitled to 
a wage for the hours in which she does not work; she must be 
available for work; and there must be no grounds for exclusion.110 
In order to satisfy the conditions on previous employment, 
the claimant must have worked at least one hour a week for 
twenty-six of the thirty-six weeks immediately preceding her first 
day of unemployment.111  If the claimant was ill during this period 
of reference, the period is prolonged by the length of the period of 
illness.112 
If one satisfies this condition, they may collect benefits for 
three months.113  In order to receive an extended benefit, 
additional conditions must be satisfied.114  These additional 
conditions require that in each of the four calendar years out of 
the five calendar years immediately preceding the beginning of a 
period of unemployment, the claimant received wages over at 
least 208 hours.115  If this is the case, any year in which 208 hours 
are worked leads to an extra benefit month insofar as the number 
is more than three, with a maximum of thirty-eight months.116  
 
 107.  See UWV (Neth.). 
 108.  Art. 16 UWV (Neth.). 
 109.  Pennings, supra note 13 at 134. 
 110.  Art. 16-17 UWV (Neth.). 
 111.  Art. 17 UWV (Neth.). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Art. 42 UWV (Neth.). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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Basically, this means one year of work is worth one benefit month. 
However, the law was changed in June 2014, and the maximum 
period was reduced to 24 months beginning in 2015.  Since the 
government wants to encourage persons more to find work and 
also to reduce expenditure. 117 
The Act imposes an obligation, not merely discretionary 
power, on the benefit administration to sanction the beneficiary if 
she does not satisfy her obligations as defined under the Law.118  
Until this Law came into force in 2006, the benefit administration 
had only discretionary powers to impose sanctions.119 
During the first two months, the benefit, in case of full 
unemployment, is 75% of the daily wage.120  After the initial, two 
month period, the level drops to 70% of an employee’s daily 
wage.121  An employee whose benefit falls below the applicable 
subsistence income, may be eligible for a supplement under the 
Supplements Act.122  When the right to benefit has ended, 
employees who have become unemployed after they have reached 
the age of fifty (together with their spouse if any) may, subject to 
certain conditions, claim a benefit under the Income Provision for 
Older and Partially Disabled Unemployed Employees.123  One of 
those conditions is that the household income is below the 
relevant subsistence minimum.124  Employees younger than fifty 
at the time they became unemployed may claim a benefit under 
the terms of the Public Assistance Act, in which case they have to 
satisfy a means test on income and capital.125 
The claimant of the unemployment benefit is obliged to notify 
the UWV at its request or on his or her own initiative immediately 
of all facts and circumstances that, in all fairness, could affect his 
or her entitlement to benefit, the assertion of his or her 
entitlement to benefit, the level or duration of the benefit or the 
benefit amount paid to the employee.126  Violation of this broadly 
formulated obligation is punishable by an administrative fine of 
 
 117.  See Important Changes in Dutch Law Taking Effect as of January 1, 2015, 
KERKMAN L. (2014). 
 118.  Art. 27 UWV (Neth.). 
 119.  See F.J.L. PENNINGS & A. C. DAMSTEEGT, DE WERKLOOSHEIDSWET (Kluwer: 
Deventer 2009). 
 120.  Art. 45 UWV (Neth.). 
 121.  Art. 47 UWV (Neth.). 
 122.  Art. 2 Toeslagenwet (Neth.).  
 123.  Art. 2 WIA (Neth.). 
 124.  Art. 5 WIA (Neth.). 
 125.  Art. 19-21 WIA (Neth.).  
 126.  Art. 25 WIA (Neth.).  
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up to 2,269 euros.127 
Unemployment benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if a 
person is considered to have become culpably unemployed because 
of an urgent reason and s/he can be blamed for this situation.128  
Grounds for such dismissal and culpable unemployment may 
include theft from the employer or violence against the employer 
and fellow employees, as a few examples.129  The list is not 
exhaustive, but in any case, it is clear that the behavior must be 
serious. 
In addition, the employee can be culpably unemployed if the 
employee requests that the employment relationship be 
terminated.130  At the same time, continuation would not have 
resulted in such difficulties for the employee that this 
continuation could not, in all fairness, have been demanded of the 
employee.131  This ground makes clear that in cases where the 
employee takes the initiative to end an employment relationship, 
s/he is culpably unemployed and benefits will be refused 
completely.132 
To conclude, if the employer took the initiative to terminate 
the unemployment relationship, the employee is safe, i.e. this has 
no effects on the benefit rights.133  This approach was adopted in 
2006 in order to allow for mobility of workers.134  Before employees 
had to fight their dismissal, as it was considered that otherwise 
they had caused more costs than necessary, which was a ground 
for refusal or reduction of benefit.135  If an employee is culpably 
unemployed, the UWV has to refuse unemployment benefits 
permanently and totally.136 
Not only in case of culpable unemployment does the 
Werkloosheidswet provide for which measure needs to be taken; 
the same applies if the claimant does not prevent becoming or 
staying unemployed as a result of neglecting to accept suitable 
work or for failing to obtain or to keep suitable work through his 
 
 127.  Art. 27 UWV (Neth). 
 128.  Art. 27 UWV (Neth.); Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 129.  Art. 24 UWV (Neth.); Art 678 BW (Neth). 
 130.  Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See Pennings & Damsteegt, supra note 119. 
 135.  Art. 22 UWV (Neth.); Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 136.  Art. 22 UWV (Neth.). 
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own fault.137  Suitable work is all work that is appropriate given 
the employee’s strength and competence, unless acceptance may 
not be demanded of him or her for reasons of a physical, mental 
or social nature.138 
If an employee neglects to accept suitable work or if he fails 
to obtain suitable work through his own fault, and remains 
unemployed because of his neglect, the benefit must permanently 
be refused over the number of hours for which the entitlement to 
benefit would have ended if the employee would have accepted or 
obtained the work in question.139  The Act also obliges the 
claimant to actively apply for work and not to impose 
requirements on work, which make it difficult to find suitable 
employment.140  Additionally, claimants are obliged to cooperate 
in pursuing education or training, that may be considered 
necessary for his employment or in other activities, which are 
beneficial to his reintegration.141 
In addition to the previously mentioned obligations, the UVW 
calls for obligations of the employee, which are designed to make 
the administration of unemployment benefits easier.142  These 
obligations concern actions or omissions by the employee 
resulting in delaying, hampering or hindering the UWV’s work.143  
Some administrative obligations must be met within a specific 
period of time.144  These concerns include notification of 
unemployment, submission of a request for benefit, registration 
as a job-seeker, and extension of that registration.145  A worksheet 
is a form listing of, among other things, questions on work done, 
and income received.146 
The Unemployment Benefit Act seeks to promote 
reintegration of persons in work or to prevent employees from 
claiming higher thresholds by reducing benefit levels and 
duration.  This provision makes it possible for employees to 
receive unemployment benefits in cases of partial 
 
 137.  Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Art. 27 UWV (Neth.). 
 140.  Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 141.  Art. 26 UWV (Neth.). 
 142.  See Art. 24 UWV (Neth.). 
 143.  Art. 24 UWV (Neth.); Art. 30 UWV (Neth.). 
 144.  Art. 26 UWV (Neth.). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Art. 6 UWV (Neth.); Art. 25 UWI (Neth.). 
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unemployment.147 
In 2013 the government asked for advice from the Social 
Economic Council on how to involve employers and trade unions 
more in administration of unemployment benefits.148  This could 
be done if employers and employees are equally responsible for 
the financing of the scheme.149  In that case the employers receive 
the full advantage of an active policy of preventing unemployment 
and helping the unemployed back to back.  This is more difficult 
to reach than in case of sickness, since unemployment can occur 
in waves, therefore, is difficult to finance and handle.150  Still, it 
is expected that the solution lies in the labor market.151 
V. HEALTH CARE SCHEME 
Until 2006, the health care system was a dual system, 
meaning only employees were covered, so long as they earned a 
low enough wage, by the compulsory Law on Health Care; others 
could buy voluntary insurance.152  This dual system was criticized 
because of the differences between the voluntary system and the 
public system, often resulting in more generous conditions for 
private insurance and a lack of compulsory insurance for 
everybody else.153  This old system was replaced in 2005 by the 
Care Insurance Act.154  The new Act obligates all residents of the 
Netherlands to take out private health care insurance.155 
This new Act was implemented because the new mechanisms 
within the act were deemed necessary for the legislature to regain 
control over health care expenses.156  The costs for medical care 
 
 147.  Art. 17 UWV (Neth.). 
 148.  Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging from 
the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, STICHTING VAN DE ARBEID 
(Apr. 11, 2013); SER, WERKLOOSHEID BEPERKEN, VOORKOMEN EN GOED VERZEKEREN 
(Feb. 2015). 
 149.  Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging from 
the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, supra note 148. 
 150.  See Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging 
from the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, supra note 148; see also 
WERKLOOSHEID BEPERKEN, VOORKOMEN EN GOED VERZEKEREN, supra note 148. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven & Frederik T. Schut, Universal Mandatory 
Health Insurance In the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?, 27 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 771, 772 (2008). 
 153. Id. at 772-73. 
 154.  See ZVW (Neth.). 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
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had been rising for several years, due to the aging of the 
population and rapid medical-technological developments, which 
brought new expensive tools, machines, and treatment methods, 
and the costs were expected to grow even further .157 
Economic approaches have become very influential in Dutch 
health care.158  The new act was designed to create a system of 
controlled competition between insurance companies; in this 
respect there is a large difference from the old version of the law, 
which was much more centrally regulated by the State.159 
The new Act was designed to ensure that insurance 
companies, care providers, and the insured, are encouraged to 
organize and use health care more efficiently.160  For this purpose, 
the Act requires each insured person (i.e., each resident) to choose 
a care insurance company from which he or she buys insurance.161  
The hope is, that as a result of the competition between insurance 
companies, the companies will focus more on the preferences of 
the insured.162  Insurance companies will also be required to make 
the ability to buy care  from care providers more efficient, 
otherwise, the contributions for which insurance companies will 
have to pay will be too high (or the losses will become too great).163   
In addition to this competition element, the Act also contains 
important solidarity elements. All residents are compulsorily 
insured, and insurance companies are required to provide all 
applicants with insurance, regardless of their personal 
characteristics and medical history, under the same conditions of 
the insurance they offer.164  The Act also guarantees that an 
insurance company can charge differently for basic insurance 
packages (i.e., the insurance regulated by the Act).165  In the Act, 
basic insurance packages are defined, outlining specifically, what 
 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
 157. .Id. 
 158.  See Id 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See Art. 2 ZVW (Neth.). 
 161.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Art. 17 ZVW (Neth.); Art. 4 WBP (Neth.). 
 165.  See generally Waarvoor ben ik Verzekerd via het Basispakket van de 
Zorgverzekering, Rijksoverheid, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ 
zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-zit-in-get-basispaket-van-de-zorgverzekering 
[https://perma.cc/QFY6-TT99] (last visited 30 Sept. 2017). 
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care must be available and under certain conditions.166  Examples 
of care that is available include: medical care by general 
practitioners, medical specialists and midwives; stays in 
hospitals; medicines; specialist medical mental health care, 
including treatment by a psychiatrist; basic mental health care, 
including primary care psychologist and an Internet treatment 
process; tools for treatment, care, rehabilitation, nursing or a 
specific limitation; physiotherapy to eighteen years; limited 
physical therapy and exercise therapy from the twenty-first 
treatment for certain chronic diseases; pelvic physiotherapy for 
urinary incontinence until the ninth treatment; speech therapy 
and occupational therapy; dental care (control and treatment) for 
children up to eighteen years; dental surgical care (surgery) and 
dentures; patient transport; maternity care; up to three hours of 
treatment dietary advice.167  The law also covers fees associated 
with up to three IVF treatments.168  Dyslexia care is also covered 
through the act.169  Finally the act provides coverage, allowing for 
participation in smoking cessation programs.170 
Insurance companies decide how health insurance plans are 
implemented.171  One of these choices that the insurance company 
may decide is whether the costs are reimbursed or if care 
providers are paid by the company directly.172  Another choice the 
insurance company may decide is whether a risk borne by the 
insured person, in addition to the statutory risk, may lead to 
contribution reductions or not.173  In view of these choices, 
insurance companies can compete with other insurance 
 
 166.   Art. 25 ZVW (Neth.). 
 167.  See generally Waarvoor ben ik Verzekerd via het Basispakket van de 
Zorgverzekering, Rijksoverheid, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ 
zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-zit-in-get-basispaket-van-de-zorgverzekering 
[https://perma.cc/6DGR-5EGW] (last visited 30 Sept. 2017). 
 168.  Nieuw IVF-beleid Levert Besparigen en Betere Zorg, Zorginstituut Nederland 
(Sept. 3 2017), https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/ 
09/nieuw.ivf-beleid-levert-besparingen-en-betere-zorg [https://perma.cc/J4BF-AG6D]. 
 169.  Een Verzekerde kan Onder Voorwaarden in Aanmerking Komen Voor 
Hulpmiddelen om Informatie tot zich te nemen, Zorginstituut Nederland 
https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/Verzekerde+zorg//hulpmiddelen-voor-
informatievoorziening [https://perma.cc/2T69-59YD] (last visited 3 Nov. 2017). 
 170.  Zorg Bij Stoppen met Roken nu al in Basispakket, Zorginstituut Nederland (7 
Feb. 2008), https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2008/07/02/zorg-
bij-stoppen-met-roken-nu-al-in-basispakket [https://perma.cc/TW3E-74WY]. 
 171.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 367. 
 172.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
 173.  Id. 
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companies and can profit from their insurance schemes.174 
Under the act there are no insured persons, there are 
individuals who have the obligation to buy insurance from an 
insurance company.175  If an individual does not buy their 
insurance, that individual is not insured.  When a person does not 
have insurance, they can be fined for not being insured.176 
A person’s insurance begins the day that the company 
receives the application for insurance; it can have a retroactive 
effect with a maximum of four months after the insured needed to 
have insurance.177  It is unconventional for insurance companies 
to have this retroactive effect, however, the justification for it is 
to guarantee that there is always insurance coverage for persons 
who later decide to purchase insurance coverage or for individuals 
who switch insurance companies at the end of the year.178 
Every year, insured individuals may terminate their 
insurance contract with their insurance company.179  The reason 
being to make it more accessible for individuals to switch 
insurance companies.180  When someone switches insurance 
companies, companies must accept all new applications no matter 
what the applicant’s risk profile is.181  Thus, those who are 
identified as a ‘bad risk’ may also change companies. 
Aside from the statutory insurance products, health care 
companies may offer supplementary insurance, which includes 
provisions and services not in the basic insurance plan.182  
Supplementary insurance is not mandatory, however it is more 
attractive for the companies because it is usually more profitable 
than the statutory insurances.183  Insurance companies are 
allowed to refuse applicants for supplementary insurance.184  For 
supplementary insurance, many companies require that the basic 
insurance is also accepted from their company, so that selection 
of the supplementary insurance may allow for the possibility of 
 
 174.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368. 
 175.  Art. 1 ZVW (Neth.); Art. 2 ZVW (Neth.). 
 176.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368. 
 177.  See ZVW (Neth.). 
 178.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
 179.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
 182.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368. 
 183.  Id. at 368-369. 
 184.  Id. at 369. 
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moving to another insurance company.185 
As we have already seen, insured individuals have to pay the 
contribution of the chosen insurance contract; this contribution 
shall be the same for all individuals who have purchased the same 
insurance plan.186  Contribution rates cannot be different whether 
for risk level and for age; however, the contribution rates may 
vary between companies.187  The contribution rate does not 
depend on income because it is flat-rate.188  The contribution can, 
however, be lower if one has opted to carry higher risk themselves 
(up to 500 euro a year), which is in addition to the compulsory 
statutory own risk carried by the insured (385 euro a year).189 
A collective contract can be provided for certain groups by 
some insurance companies.190  Collective contracts may be used 
“for groups such as members of a football club, trade union, an 
association of patients, or employees of a particular enterprise; 
there is no limit to the type of group with which an insurance 
company can make an agreement.”191  Individuals who are under 
eighteen years old do not have to pay contributions; individuals 
with a low income may receive compensation for paying the 
contribution that is paid by the Tax Office.192 
Employers must contribute, based on wages, to a risk 
equalization fund.193  A risk equalization fund repays an 
insurance company for higher than average risk individuals.194  
The purpose of this fund was to lower the risk of insurance 
companies discouraging high risk individuals from buying 
insurance, like those who are chronically sick.195  This does not 
motivate insurance companies to be efficient when purchasing 
 
 185.  Margreet Reitsma-van Rooijen, Aanvullende zorgverzekering zonder 
basisverzekering niet altijd mogelijk, NIVEL (12 Dec. 2012), 
http://www.nivel.nl/nieuws/aanvullende-zorgverzekering-zonder-basisverzekering-
niet-altijd-mogelijk-3 [https://perma.cc/DPX2-BZ4V]. 
 186.  Art. 17 ZVW (Neth.). 
 187.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 369. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Wat is het eigen risico van mijn zorgverzekering en wanneer betaal ik dit?, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/eigen-
risico-zorgverzekering [https://perma.cc/3WXL-SVXD] (last visited 21 Dec. 2017). 
 190.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 369. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 368. 
 193.  Id. at 369. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Van Toelichting). 
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care because they are repaid.196  Due to this reason, the 
equalization will take place ex ante only or based on clients’ 
specific characteristics.197 
The contents of the health care to be provided are still defined 
by statutory rules, but the administration of the health benefits 
is by private organizations.198  Therefore, this system balances 
being cooperative and being profitable.  The purpose of this 
system is to make the system more efficient, with market 
instruments, while providing affordable and adequate health care 
for all residents.199 
VI. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ACTIVISM IN THE DUTCH 
BENEFIT SYSTEM 
In this description of the Dutch system, we have not 
described all benefits (e.g., family benefits and survivor benefits 
are not mentioned), but a major part.  Sickness and disability 
benefits have been refocused in the past decade to encourage 
persons to stay or reintegrate into work.200  For sickness benefits 
this has been done by giving the full responsibility to the employer 
(though carefully defining the statutory framework for the powers 
and obligations of the employer).201  Although employees certainly 
feel the effects of this change and have clear obligations for 
cooperating in re-integration themselves, the major focus is on the 
employer, who no longer benefits from the solidarity of other 
employers that was previously organized in the Sickness Benefits 
Act.202 
With disability, the focus is more on the employees.  They are 
encouraged, after the wage-related period, by financial 
instruments to take up work.203  These persons will first have had 
a period during which they and their employer had to undertake 
re-integration activities.204  After this, the employee can, as long 
as there is an employment relationship, require the employer to 
undertake reintegration activities, and this may cause the 
 
 196.  Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 370. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See generally ZVW (Neth.). 
 199.  See Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 370. 
 200.  See Part II. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See Part III. 
 204.  Id. 
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employer to feel the effects of the Disability Act.205  As a result of 
this system, disabled persons with better chances on the labor 
market receive a higher benefit.206  Thus, the system does not 
merely respond to differences in disability, but other factors, such 
as having a (cooperative) employer, having a network, being 
‘employable’, being motivated and sufficiently qualified, play an 
important role.207 
Unemployment benefits have also undergone an important 
change in terms of prevention.  Since 2006, after a decision of the 
employer to dismiss an employee, the latter is admitted to the 
benefit system if the others conditions are fulfilled.  Here, the 
benefit system is used to serve as “oil for the labour market,”208 
workers should be encouraged to go where they are needed, and 
may make use of the benefit in the intermediary period.209  
Currently, the Government asked the Social-Economic Council to 
investigate whether incentives, like for sick pay, can be 
introduced as well for employers to keep their employees fit for 
work (‘employable’) during their employment relationship, so that 
they can more easily find a job when they are dismissed.210  In 
case of unemployment, it is more difficult to impose measures on 
employers dismissing employees, since these include also 
enterprises with economic problems. 
With respect to the Health Care Insurance Act, one must first 
acknowledge that solidarity has increased, since, until this Act, 
only employees up to a certain wage were compulsorily insured.  
The present system covers all residents.211  Since the companies 
compete with each other, it is not a solidarity system as such.212  
However, the government keeps a strict control on maximum 
contributions and rises in contributions.213  By having lower 
contributions for those who accept their own high risks, making 
special insurance products for those with academic degrees, and 
through means of special supplementary insurances, companies 
try to select more attractive clients.214 
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The prohibition of risk selection (even in the case of a new 
choice for a company) and the obligation to ask for the same 
contributions of all buyers of the same insurance product are also 
important elements of solidarity.  Furthermore, the obligation of 
the employer to pay a wage-related contribution and the risk 
equalization fund achieves solidarity, this time between the 
companies, as they share responsibility for the heavy risks.215  
Here we see a tension, however, since the question is whether it 
hinders effective working of the insurance market, as such a fund 
does not fit well with profit-making companies. 
Thus the approach does not lie in continuously changing the 
rules, or applying the rules more strictly or less strictly in order 
to be more efficient and to save money, because the actors in 
society will try to shift their costs to the collective funds if there 
is such a responsibility.  This must not be seen an immoral 
behaviour, but as a rational approach, at least at an individual 
level, so also a rational response is required. 
Such rational response can lie at putting the responsibilities 
at the lowest level, with those who are directly concerned.  Thus, 
they will organize an adequate approach.  This can be different 
from benefit to benefit: i.e. the approach in case of sickness differs 
from unemployment, disability and health care. 
It is important that the employees are not negatively affected 
and that thus, for instance in the case of sickness, the way of 
assessing sickness, the level and duration of sick pay, the grounds 
for exclusion and sanction and the exceptions to the obligation to 
pay sick pay are strictly defined.  In addition, labor law should not 
allow escape routes (such as dismissal), and there has to be a 
quick and accessible court system.  If this exists, the system does 
not deprive employees from their rights, but it encourages 
employers to do much more to prevent sickness and help people 
back to work.  In this respect, the outcome is overall positive: it 
does not rely on public finances and people find work that they 
can still do.  There may still be problems in some areas, especially 
in case of persons who are often ill which may be dismissed in 
periods of recovery.  There is also a tendency that employers evade 
permanent employment contracts and prefer short-term contacts 
of temporary agency workers instead.216  The government has now 
 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  A.R. HOUWELING, M.J.M.T. KEULAERDS, & P. KRUIT, VAAN – VVA 
EVALUATIEONDERZOEK WWZ 2016, (Den Haag, 2016), http://njb.nl/ 
Uploads/2016/7/vaan-vva-evaluatieonderzoek-wwz-2016.pdf  [https://perma.cc/Q4YA-
FCWA]. 
PENNINGSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/18  3:00 PM 
26 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19.1 
introduced a system where employers have to pay a higher 
contribution for sick pay if their former employees become sick or 
disabled.217  In this way it is hoped that the share of flexible work 
is reduced. 
The last example shows that the system will never be perfect. 
It is also quite uncertain whether it can be exported to other 
countries, as systems vary immensely and also the system of 
labour law is decisive for the success, which system may be 
different from country to country.  The last issue is that detailed 
data on the income effects, on people back to work, on the quality 
of work etc. etc. are missing.  Still, I hope that the development in 
the Netherlands is useful for discussion on how a system can be 
shaped in terms of distributing responsibilities and thus 
influencing costs while basically leaving the rights of the 
claimants intact. 
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